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FEATURE COMMENT: Considering 
The Effects Of Public Procurement 
Regulations On Competitive Markets
Professor Albert Sanchez Graells of the University 
of Hull (UK) recently published a vitally important 
book on procurement law, Public Procurement and 
the EU Competition Rules (Hart Publishing 2011). 
In his carefully researched study, Sanchez Graells 
asked what seems like a simple question: Shouldn’t 
regulators, when writing procurement regulations, 
consider the likely impact of those regulations on 
competitive markets? Sanchez Graells, who will be 
addressing this point at an upcoming George Wash-
ington University Law School symposium, pointed 
out that far too little attention has been paid to 
the anticompetitive impact of public procurement 
regulation:
[T]his significant area of overlap between 
competition and public procurement law (ie, 
the competition distortions that public procure-
ment regulations and administrative practices 
can produce themselves) still remains unex-
plored. Generally, publicly-created distortions 
of competition in the field of public procure-
ment have not yet been effectively tackled 
by either competition or public procurement 
law—probably because of the major political 
and governance implications embedded in or 
surrounding public procurement activities, 
which make development and enforcement of 
competition law and policy in this area an even 
more complicated issue, and sometimes muddy 
the analysis and normative recommendations. 
Notwithstanding these relevant difficulties, ...  
this is a very relevant area of competition 
policy to which development could bring sub-
stantial improvements and, consequently, it 
merits more attention than it has traditionally 
received.
Id. at 9.
This FeaTure CommenT assesses Sanchez 
Graells’ thesis from a U.S. perspective. As the 
discussion below explains, in many ways the U.S. 
federal procurement system stands at one end of 
a spectrum. Even when the question was squarely 
before regulators—when they were assessing how 
procurement rules should be shaped to take ad-
vantage of commercial efficiencies—regulators ap-
parently never seriously considered the collateral 
impact of their rules on those same markets. 
Regulators in the U.S. federal system instead 
typically focus on best value, i.e., on how to shape 
procurement rules to maximize competition within 
a procurement itself, to gain the best value for the 
public money spent. See, e.g., FAR 1.102(a), 48 CFR 
§ 1.102(a) (“The vision for the Federal Acquisition 
System is to deliver on a timely basis the best value 
product or service to the customer, while maintain-
ing the public’s trust and fulfilling public policy 
objectives.”). As the discussion below explains, 
although there is clear legal authority calling for a 
prospective analysis of procurement rules’ costs and 
benefits to the competitive marketplace, U.S. policy-
makers often fail to assess the competitive impact 
that procurement regulations are likely to have.
At the other end of the spectrum, European reg-
ulators often place first emphasis on procurement 
regulations’ impact on the market—sometimes to 
the detriment of best value. As the University of 
Nottingham’s Professor Sue Arrowsmith recently 
argued, while the EU’s procurement directives set 
minimum requirements for all the European mem-
ber states’ procurement laws, European policymak-
ers’ central goal in framing those directives was to 
integrate the European internal market—not to 
maximize best value in procurement. 
[T]he directives are concerned primarily to 
promote the internal market, as indicated by 
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their legal base, and ... they do this by perform-
ing three functions: prohibiting discrimination, 
securing transparency to allow monitoring and 
enforcement of the non-discrimination rule, and 
removing barriers to market access.
*      *      *
Finally, and importantly, we rejected the notion 
that the directives seek value for money [best 
value] for Member States, either in a narrow 
sense of reliably securing what is needed on the 
best terms, or in a wider sense that embraces the 
decision on what to buy.
Arrowsmith, “The Purpose of the EU Procurement 
Directives: Ends, Means and the Implications for Na-
tional Regulatory Space for Commercial and Horizon-
tal Procurement Policies,” at 46–47, in The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 2011–2012, Vol. 
14 (Barnard, Gehring and Solanke, eds., Hart Pub-
lishing 2013).
The discussion below, following Sanchez Graells’ 
lead, suggests a middle course. Rather than making 
economic integration the focus of procurement regu-
lation (the approach that Arrowsmith attributes to 
the EU procurement directives), the discussion below 
suggests that those drafting federal procurement 
rules in the U.S. should consider the impact of those 
rules on the broader competitive market, and should 
mold those rules, if appropriate, to minimize adverse 
competitive impacts. This would not mean that the 
procurement rules exist primarily to integrate the 
broader commercial market (the European focus), but 
rather would mean that the U.S. procurement system 
governed by those rules would, to the extent possible, 
integrate efficiently with that commercial market.
Why Regulators Should Assess Procurement 
Rules’ Impacts on the Broader Market—There is 
a substantial body of literature, both nationally and 
internationally, which confirms that procurement 
rules can have significant anticompetitive effects, both 
inside and outside the procurement market. See, e.g., 
Anderson, Kovacic and Müller, “Ensuring Integrity and 
Competition in Public Procurement Markets: A Dual 
Challenge for Good Governance,” in The WTO Regime 
on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform 
681 (Arrowsmith and Anderson, eds., World Trade Or-
ganization 2011); Anderson and Müller, “Competition 
Policy and Poverty Reduction: A Holistic Approach,” 
at 12 (WTO Staff Working Paper ERSD-2013-02, Feb. 
20, 2013), available at ssrn.com/abstract=2223977; 
Yukins, “A Case Study in Comparative Procurement 
Law: Assessing UNCITRAL’s Lessons for U.S. Procure-
ment,” 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 457, 462–63 (2006) (assessing 
anticompetitive impact of electronic procurement regu-
lations); Nensala, “Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 12: How HSPD-12 May Limit Competition 
Unnecessarily and Suggestions for Reform,” 40 Pub. 
Cont. L.J. 619 (2010) (impact of security regulation on 
competition); Haberbush, “Limiting the Government’s 
Exposure to Bid Rigging Schemes: A Critical Look at 
the Sealed Bidding Regime,” 30 Pub. Cont. L.J. 97, 103 
(2000) (sealed bidding, as required by Government, 
itself facilitates bidder collusion); Malhotra, “Study on 
Government Procurement: Study for Evidence-Based 
Competition Advocacy” (January 2012) (case studies 
of how Indian procurement rules have anticompeti-
tive impact), available at sps.iitd.ac.in/PDF/SGP.
pdf; UK Office of Fair Trading, “Assessing the Impact 
of Public Sector Procurement on Competition” (2004) 
(privately prepared report), available at www.oft.gov.
uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft742b.pdf. But 
cf. Thaggert, “Antitrust and Public Procurement—The 
United States,” 7 Comp. L. Int’l 82, 84 (2011) (describ-
ing U.S. federal procurement disclosure rules which are 
intended to stem anticompetitive conduct by bidders).
As studies have emphasized, procurement rules 
can have—or mask—significant anticompetitive be-
havior. See, e.g., Cushman, “The ABA Model Procure-
ment Code: Implementation, Evolution, and Crisis 
of Survival,” 25 Pub. Cont. L.J. 173, 193–94 (1996) 
(“procedural compliance with [procurement] rules can 
actually mask improper conduct rather than prevent[] 
it; compliance with form disguises anticompetitive or 
worse activities”). These anticompetitive impacts may 
include the following.
Raising Barriers to Entry: Rigid rules govern-
ing competition in procurement can, in effect, lock 
prospective bidders out of a procurement market. 
See, e.g., Kennedy-Loest, Thomas and Farley, “EU 
Public Procurement and Competition Law: The Yin 
and Yang of the Legal World?,” 7 Comp. L. Int’l 77, 80 
(2011) (closely limited awards in Northern Ireland of 
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity (framework) 
agreements locked out potential competitors). These 
barriers can, in turn, cripple those firms that oth-
erwise would have competed in related commercial 
markets, if they had used public contracts to leverage 
their market positions.
Collusion among Bidders: Because of the nature 
of the Government’s highly structured bidding pro-
cess, that process may, in practice, facilitate collusion 
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among bidders. See, e.g., Haberbush, supra, at 103; 
Albano and Spagnolo, “Asymmetry and Collusion in 
Sequential Procurement: A ‘Large Lot Last’ Policy,” 
10 B.E. J. Theoretical Econs., Art. 43 (2010); Ishii, 
“Favor Exchange in Collusion: Empirical Study of 
Repeated Procurement Auctions in Japan,” 27 Int’l J. 
Indus. Org. 137 (2009). Some observers believe that 
this can, in turn, have spillover effects in the private 
marketplace, as public bidders leverage collusion in 
public markets for gains in commercial markets. Cf. 
DeSanti and Nagata, “Competitor Communications: 
Facilitating Practices or Invitations to Collude? An 
Application of Theories of Proposed Horizontal Agree-
ments Submitted for Antitrust Review,” 63 Antitrust 
L.J. 93 (U.S. Federal Trade Commission alleged that 
manufacturers used public procurement auctions for 
competitor communications).
Artificially Buoying Price: Government pricing 
policies in procurement also may have a collateral ef-
fect in the commercial market. The General Services 
Administration, for example, insists that contractors 
on its Multiple Award Schedule (MAS) contracts 
commit to pass any commercial discounts on to the 
contractors’ Government customers as well. The MAS 
most-favored customer provision, known as the Price 
Reductions clause, means, in practice, that vendors, 
competing in a market where all competitors face 
collateral price impacts for lowering their commercial 
prices, may decline to decrease their prices, public or 
commercial. See, e.g., Woodward, “The Perverse Effect 
of the Multiple Award Schedules’ Price Reductions 
Clause,” 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 527, 544–49 (2012). A price 
effect of this type is in keeping with the economic 
literature, which warns that most-favored customer 
provisions can artificially buoy prices in the commer-
cial marketplace by discouraging price discounting. 
See, e.g., Cooper, “Most-Favored-Customer Pricing 
and Tacit Collusion,” 17 Rand J. Econs. 377 (1986).
There is, therefore, little doubt that procurement 
rules can have significant competitive impacts in 
the commercial marketplace—and, indeed, there is 
substantial agreement on the types of impacts those 
rules may have. The question, then, is whether U.S. 
regulators have considered those potential effects 
when framing new procurement rules.
The Commercial-Item Revolution: A Lost 
Opportunity to Consider Market Impact—One 
obvious opportunity for regulators to have consid-
ered the market impact of procurement rules was 
when the Government changed its rules to facilitate 
commercial buying by the Government. Regulators 
were reshaping the procurement rules to bring fed-
eral purchasers of commercial items into the private 
marketplace; it would have been a logical extension of 
those reforms to consider those revised rules’ impact 
on that private marketplace. To this day, it remains a 
puzzle why U.S. regulators apparently never consid-
ered the market impacts of the new commercial-item 
purchasing rules. 
In the 1990s, the U.S. Government substantially 
reshaped its procurement rules regarding the pur-
chase of commercial goods and services—“commercial 
items,” as they are known in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation. FAR 2.101 and pt. 12, 48 CFR § 2.101 
and pt. 12. See generally O’Sullivan and Perry, “Com-
mercial Item Acquisitions,” 97-05 Briefing Papers 1 
(April 1997).
In retrospect, one striking aspect of the commer-
cial-item revolution was that in developing the new 
rules, the Government never undertook—nor appar-
ently even considered—a formal analysis to determine 
the new rules’ market impact. That economic-impact 
analysis probably would have been part of a cost- 
benefit assessment, and cost-benefit analysis was 
already an established aspect of U.S. rulemaking. See 
EO 12291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (Feb. 19, 1981), available 
at www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/ 
executive-order/12291.html; see also EO 12866, 58 
Fed. Reg. 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993), available at www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eo12866.pdf. See gener-
ally title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995 (2 USCA §§ 1532–1538) (calling for an assess-
ment of economic impact). 
Moreover, a number of published studies had 
already warned that public procurement rules could 
cause significant distortions in commercial markets. 
See, e.g., Sanchez Graells, supra, at 11, 56–57 (citing 
Kettl, “Sharing Power: Public Governance and Pri-
vate Markets,” at 31 (1993); ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law, Antitrust Law Developments, at 1107–09 (3d ed. 
1992); Note, “Gains from a Unified European Commu-
nity Public Procurement Market: An Analysis Using 
Auction Theory,” 1990 Brigham Young University Law 
Review 1727, 1729 (1990); Carroll and Scott, “The 
Modification of Industry Performance through the 
Use of Government Monopsony Power,” 3 Indus. Org. 
Rev. 28 (1975); Round, “The Impact of Government 
Purchases on Market Performance in Australia,” 1 
Rev. Indus. Org. 94 (1984)). Finally, the federal public 
procurement system was already an economic behe-
¶ 64
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moth by the time of the commercial-item reforms—by 
fiscal year 1988, federal procurement had reached 
$200 billion annually. See Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy, “Federal Procurement Data System: 
Standard Report, Fiscal Year 1988 through Fourth 
Quarter (October 1, 1987 through September 30, 
1988),” at 2, available at www.fpds.gov/downloads/
FPR_Reports/Fiscal%20Year%201981%20-%202002/
FEDPROCREPORT_FY1988-4Q.pdf. 
As a result, an objective observer likely would 
have concluded that the commercial-item reforms 
would have a material impact on the broader com-
petitive economy because the reforms would allow the 
Government to play a much larger role, as a buyer, in 
the commercial markets. These new public procure-
ment regulations, specifically intended to increase 
the Government’s presence in the broader commer-
cial market, with attendant costs and benefits, were 
therefore precisely the type of rulemaking that should 
have triggered an analysis of the rules’ likely impact 
on the competitive markets. Cf. Shapiro and Brainard, 
“Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast 
Track: Building Common Ground on Trade Demands 
More Than a Name Change,” 35 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. 
Rev. 1, 30 and n. 166 (2003) (proposed U.S. legislation, 
intended to reduce market barriers to entry, would 
have required that international trade agreements 
regarding procurement call for cost-benefit analyses 
of proposed procurement rules).
The administrative record, however, indicates 
that the drafters of the new policies never considered 
such a cost-benefit analysis. Cf. 60 Fed. Reg. 48231 
(Sept. 18, 1995) (although commercial-item rulemak-
ing was, by its terms, subject to Office of Management 
and Budget review under EO 12866, notice accompa-
nying sweeping new FAR pt. 12 (commercial-item) 
rules made no reference to cost-benefit analysis or 
to the impact of new commercial-item rules on com-
petitive markets); see also Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs, OIRA historical reports search 
webpage, available at www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eoHistReviewSearch, under “Agency” pull-down menu 
select “Department of Defense,” and under  “Calendar 
Year” select “1995” (RIN 0750-AB00, the OIRA report 
number for the DOD changes to commercial-item 
acquisition based on FASA, indicates that DOD clas-
sified the revolutionary commercial-items regulatory 
changes as “not economically significant”; a cost-
benefit analysis is only required for economically 
significant regulatory changes, see infra pg. 7). The 
two key (and comprehensive) reports that established 
the foundation for the commercial-item reforms were 
the 1986 “Packard Commission” report and the 1993 
“Section 800 Panel” report. See “Report of the Acquisi-
tion Advisory Panel to the Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy and the United States Congress” 39–41 
(January 2007) (discussing history). In both of those 
reports, however, the reformers’ central goal was to 
lower prices for public procurements; the answer, in 
both instances, was to rely more heavily on the com-
mercial market. 
One of the primary findings of the Packard Com-
mission, for example, was that then-current public 
procurement regulations allowed agencies to require 
Government-unique specifications for Government 
products, “despite the commercial availability of ad-
equate alternative items costing much less” (emphasis 
added). See President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, “A Quest For Excellence: Final 
Report to the President,” at 44, 60 (June 1986), avail-
able at www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/36ex2.pdf. The 
Packard Commission therefore recommended that 
“[r]ather than relying on excessively rigid military 
specifications, [the Department of Defense] should 
make much greater use of components, systems, and 
services available [commercially] ‘off the shelf.’ ” Id. 
at xxv. 
Similarly, the Section 800 Panel identified DOD’s 
primary acquisition threat as a “continued reliance 
by DOD on defense-unique products [that] can only 
mean higher costs and loss of industrial base for DoD” 
(emphasis added). See DOD Acquisition Law Advisory 
Panel, “Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws: Ex-
ecutive Summary,” at 12 (March 1993), available at 
www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA264919. 
The perspective thus was one-sided: reformers con-
sidered only what the commercial market could do 
for the Government’s public procurement, and the 
reports never seemed to consider what the revamped 
public procurement regulations would do to the com-
petitive commercial markets. 
Rulemaking Should Consider Costs and 
Benefits, Including Market Impacts—Twenty 
years later, the commercial-item revolution appears 
to be receding in the face of new statutes and regu-
lations that have reversed many of its initial gains. 
See, e.g., Acquisition Reform Working Group, “2012 
Legislative Recommendations,” at 12 (April 2012), 
available at www.ndia.org/advocacy/resources/
pages/arWG.aspx. Should the regulatory pendulum 
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swing towards liberalized commercial-item procure-
ment again, however, regulators should first consider 
the impact of those revised rules on the commercial 
markets. 
The analysis of empirical data of that kind will 
allow public procurement policymakers to weigh the 
prospective economic costs of different approaches, 
which will in turn help guide public procurement 
rulemaking that has net positive impacts on the 
economy. The specific processes used to incorporate 
cost-benefit analysis will depend on the particular 
regulation being considered. Here, we consider how, 
within the analytical framework contemplated by 
law, the Government would incorporate cost-benefit 
analyses into its public procurement rulemaking 
processes.
The primary procedural requirements for U.S. 
rulemaking are established by the Administrative 
Procedures Act. See 5 USCA §§ 551–559. The APA 
establishes requirements for five types of rulemak-
ing processes: formal, informal, hybrid, direct final 
and negotiated rulemaking. Id. §§ 552–557; see also 
Burrows and Garvey, Congressional Research Ser-
vice, “A Brief Overview of Rulemaking and Judicial 
Review,” CRS Report No. R41546, at 1 (Jan. 4, 2011). 
The informal notice-and-comment rulemaking con-
templated by the APA is the most common form of 
rulemaking in executive agencies, and is the type of 
rulemaking normally used for public procurement 
rules under the FAR. See Manuel et al., CRS, “The 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): Answers to 
Frequently Asked Questions,” CRS Rep. No. R42826, 
at 11 (Nov. 16, 2012). 
It has been noted, however, that rulemaking un-
der the FAR is not, strictly speaking, governed by the 
APA. See U.S. v. AEY, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D. Fla. 
2009). The APA, by its terms, exempts Government 
procurement contracts from its notice-and-comment 
requirements. See 5 USCA § 553(a). Instead, rulemak-
ing under the FAR is governed by the Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy Act, 41 USCA § 1301 et seq., and 
the FAR includes its own notice-and-comment provi-
sion at FAR 1.501, 48 CFR § 1.501. See AEY, 603 F. 
Supp. at 1374.
In federal rulemaking, the most extensive re-
quirements for cost-benefit analysis—which would, 
presumably, be the rubric under which procurement 
regulations’ market impact would be assessed—have 
come through executive orders and guidance. See, e.g., 
Copeland, CRS, “Cost-Benefit and Other Analysis Re-
quirements in the Rulemaking Process,” CRS Report 
No. R41974, at 3, 11 (Aug. 11, 2011), available at www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41974.pdf. 
EO 12866, issued by President Clinton on Sept. 
30, 1993, remains in effect for executive agency cost-
benefit analysis requirements. 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 
(1993). President Obama reaffirmed “the principles, 
structures, and definitions governing contemporary 
regulatory review that were established in Executive 
Order 12866 of September 30, 1993.” See EO 13563, 
76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011), available at www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
eo12866/eo13563_01182011.pdf. EO 12866 applies 
to cabinet-level agencies and independent agen-
cies, but not to independent regulatory agencies. Id. 
§ 3(b). Notably, § 3(d) of the order, which defines the 
“regulations” or “rules” covered by the order, exempts 
regulations that pertain to military functions, “other 
than procurement regulations” (emphasis added). 
This “double-negative”—an exception to an exemp-
tion—thus seems to bring the FAR’s procurement 
regulations squarely within EO 12866 and its require-
ment for a regulatory cost-benefit analysis.
Section 3(f) of the executive order defines eco-
nomically significant rules as agency regulations 
that may “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy 
of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a 
material way the economy, a sector of the economy, 
productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, 
public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal gov-
ernments or communities” (emphasis added). Id. 
§ 3(f)(1). Section 6(a)(3)(C) of the executive order then 
requires agencies proposing economically signifi-
cant rules to incorporate into their decision-making 
process a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed rule, 
and an assessment of reasonable alternatives to the 
proposed rule. 
In September 2003, OMB issued Circular A-4, 
which standardized “the way benefits and costs 
of Federal regulatory actions are measured and 
reported.” See OMB, “Circular A-4—Subject: Regu-
latory Analysis,” at 1 (Sept. 17, 2003), available 
at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf; see also 
OIRA, “Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer,” 
at 2–3, available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_ 
regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf. It also re-
quires an agency to provide its proposed rule’s cost-
benefit analysis, called a regulatory impact analysis, 
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to OIRA for review. See OMB, “Circular A-4—Subject: 
Regulatory Analysis,” at 48. 
The impacts that economically significant pro-
curement rules have on competitive commercial 
markets are, it seems, precisely the types of impacts 
contemplated by EO 12866 and OMB Circular A-4—
the impacts which should be assessed during the 
rulemaking process, as part of a broader cost-benefit 
analysis. The “commercial market” is part of the 
“economy,” and certainly a “sector of the economy” 
under the executive order, and many proposed public 
procurement rules will easily reach the $100 million 
threshold, since the size of the annual federal public 
procurement market currently exceeds $500 billion. 
A proposed rule governing commercial items, 
which touched only 1/50th of one percent of the $500 
billion federal procurement budget, for example, 
would still reach the $100 million threshold for eco-
nomically significant rules, subject to the executive 
order. And even if that monetary threshold is not met, 
the executive order arguably reaches, in the alterna-
tive, procurement rules which will materially affect 
competition in the economy—which is precisely the 
adverse economic impact warned of by so many eco-
nomic studies, such as those previously cited. 
Were the U.S. to adopt this approach, and weigh 
in advance the adverse competitive effects of procure-
ment rules, the Government could avoid rules with 
substantial net negative impacts on the economy. The 
Government would, moreover, be acting in accord with 
international best practices. Although every country 
has slightly different rulemaking processes, cost-
benefit analysis is being embraced internationally 
where, as here, a rule is likely to have a material com-
petitive impact. See, e.g., Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, “Recommendation of 
the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance” 
(March 12, 2012) (calling for prospective assessment 
of competitive impacts).
Conclusion—As the discussion above reflects, a 
substantial body of literature confirms that procure-
ment rules can have a significant negative impact on 
competitive commercial markets. Procurement rules 
can, for example, raise new barriers to entry in the 
commercial marketplace, facilitate collusion in the 
commercial space, or artificially buoy commercial 
prices. Federal procurement regulators have not, as 
a regular matter, assessed those possible impacts 
in past rulemaking, but sound practice and legal 
authority, including an executive order, seem to call 
for such assessments. Assessing procurement rules’ 
likely impact on competitive markets would be in 
accord with best practices in rulemaking, and would 
help ensure that the federal procurement system 
integrates efficiently, and not disruptively, into the 
broader economy.
F
This Feature Comment was written for The Gov-
ernment Contractor by Christopher R. Yukins 
and Lieutenant Colonel Jose A. Cora. Chris 
Yukins is a Professor of Government Contract 
Law and Co-Director of the Government Pro-
curement Law Program at the George Washing-
ton University Law School. Jose Cora is a Judge 
Advocate in the U.S. Army, was an Associate 
Professor of Contract and Fiscal Law at the 
U.S. Army JAG School from 2007–2010, and is 
currently a 2013 George Washington University 
LL.M. Candidate in Government Procurement 
Law. Further information on the GWU Law 
School March 12 and 14, 2013 symposium on 
competition and procurement law is available 
at www.law.gwu.edu/News/2012-2013Events/
Pages/CompetitionProcurementSymposium.
aspx. Several of the authors cited in this article, 
including Albert Sanchez Graells, Gian Luigi 
Albano, William Kovacic and Robert Anderson, 
will be speaking at that symposium on March 14.
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